In early nineties Farooq Abdullah had to leave for an overseas trip. On the day of his departure some visitors came to his Delhi residence. While entertaining them, he received a phone call from some security agency asking him whether he needed their services for his safe travel to Delhi Airport. Farooq narrated this message to his guests and told them that he had rejected this offer “why should I accept their offer for security ? I have no risk because I am the man behind all that is happening in Kashmir”. It was not only Farooq Abdullah, but every politician of Kashmir who projected himself to be the man behind the insurgency. Abdul Rashid Kabuli of BJP went to an overseas trip for ‘mobilizing the world opinion in favour of the ongoing movement’. Farooq, Kabuli and other pro-establishment leaders did it in private meetings. As the meetings were private, away from a common man, that made it fairly easy for them to back out from the words they had uttered earlier and subsequently assuming a quite opposite posture. Contrary to this, Resistance leaders did it publicly. One of the pro-movement activists went to the extent of saying that it was he who hatched the plan of Kashmir insurgency along with Late General Akhtar Abdur Rehman of Pakistan. The claims continued as long as there was an upward swing in the militancy. When militancy started to recede, the trend also reversed. Yasin Malik started to talk about Gandhian way of passive resistance. Shabir Shah started to talk about environment and victims of insurgency. He announced creation of a trust for welfare of the victims and proclaimed that he is going to donate one crore rupee to the trust. Jammat Ameer G. M. Bhat scraped the chapter of insurgency from the Roodad( proceedings) of Jammat. Syed Ali Geelani did not do such a volta face. However, he too is apologetic on the role of Jamma’t during insurgency. He says since all the people of Kashmir supported insurgency and workers of Jamma’t were also from amongst the masses they too got involved in it. In other words, he conceded that Jamm’at people instead of leading masses follow them. Since masses have distanced from the militancy, Jamma’t too remains aloof from it.
It was perceived that militancy will die down once political leaders dissociate from it. Even Indian intelligence agencies were having the same perception. These agencies boasted in meetings that they have been able to wean away every significant political entity from the insurgency. Contrary to these estimations, militancy did not die. It reemerged with more potency. What died down was the extortions, group rivalries, meddling with trivial disputes of land and marriages on the part of militants. People have started to think that these vices were associated with militancy because of politicians and once the politicians dissociated from it the vices also came to an end. In fact presumption relating to decline of insurgency with distancing of politicians from it was misplaced. Hurriyat Conference is product of armed resistance and not its creator. The fact that insurgency continued even after distancing of politicians from it indicates that they are not indispensable for it. Even if Hurriyat compromises with government of India, it is unlikely to have impact upon the ground realties. History of Kashmir also indicates the same. In 1975 Sheikh Abdullah compromised with Indian Government. He became Chief Minister as a result of this compromise. It was perceived that secessionism in Kashmir will die down once Sheikh enters into an agreement with New Delhi. He however couldn’t sell Kashmir accession to India to people in spite of his charisma and popularity. In fact masses turned to more radical groups for their leadership after Sheikh deserted them. Actually it was emergence of this radical leadership that led to the ongoing insurgency. Desertion of Hurriyat may also lead to exclusive domination of radicals over Kashmir politics making it impossible for Indian State to tackle the situation. Hurriyat should not overestimate its own strength. If people respond to its calls of Hartal and election boycott it’s not because of peoples’ love for Hurriyat Leaders but because of their attachment to Kashmir cause . Once people feel that Hurriyat has outlived its utility, it will not take them much time to throw it into the dustbin of history. Its leaders at that juncture may not be able to flee bag and baggage.
Another important point that our Hurriyat leaders need to attend to is to formulate a clear cut stand relating to what minimum it expects to be the result of tripartite talks. Resolution through tripartite talks only provides a modus oprandi not the solution itself. Those who have no stakes in the dispute can suggest such a way out. But for people for whom the resolution of Kashmir problem is a matter of life and death, this does not mean anything unless it reflects the wishes of Kashmiri masses. In order to formulate this stand there is a need of a public debate. Those who have monopolized the movement cannot be expected to decide upon the issue that concerns Kashmir society as a whole. Public debate is also likely to generate new ideas that can serve as food for thought and material for home work for our leaders. Our leaders are presumed to do such a home work before participating in any sort of negotiations. Internationally, India at present is under tremendous pressure for resolution of Kashmir dispute. Any wrong step on the part of leaders can provide it a pretext to blunt this pressure and score points in its propaganda warfare. There are also very strong reasons to believe that offer for negotiations is not motivated by a sincere desire for seeking a solution but an attempt to keep the leadership engaged in a futile exercise of talks. This can provide a cover and a time to break the will of insurgency through extensive use of military might.
It was perceived that militancy will die down once political leaders dissociate from it. Even Indian intelligence agencies were having the same perception. These agencies boasted in meetings that they have been able to wean away every significant political entity from the insurgency. Contrary to these estimations, militancy did not die. It reemerged with more potency. What died down was the extortions, group rivalries, meddling with trivial disputes of land and marriages on the part of militants. People have started to think that these vices were associated with militancy because of politicians and once the politicians dissociated from it the vices also came to an end. In fact presumption relating to decline of insurgency with distancing of politicians from it was misplaced. Hurriyat Conference is product of armed resistance and not its creator. The fact that insurgency continued even after distancing of politicians from it indicates that they are not indispensable for it. Even if Hurriyat compromises with government of India, it is unlikely to have impact upon the ground realties. History of Kashmir also indicates the same. In 1975 Sheikh Abdullah compromised with Indian Government. He became Chief Minister as a result of this compromise. It was perceived that secessionism in Kashmir will die down once Sheikh enters into an agreement with New Delhi. He however couldn’t sell Kashmir accession to India to people in spite of his charisma and popularity. In fact masses turned to more radical groups for their leadership after Sheikh deserted them. Actually it was emergence of this radical leadership that led to the ongoing insurgency. Desertion of Hurriyat may also lead to exclusive domination of radicals over Kashmir politics making it impossible for Indian State to tackle the situation. Hurriyat should not overestimate its own strength. If people respond to its calls of Hartal and election boycott it’s not because of peoples’ love for Hurriyat Leaders but because of their attachment to Kashmir cause . Once people feel that Hurriyat has outlived its utility, it will not take them much time to throw it into the dustbin of history. Its leaders at that juncture may not be able to flee bag and baggage.
Another important point that our Hurriyat leaders need to attend to is to formulate a clear cut stand relating to what minimum it expects to be the result of tripartite talks. Resolution through tripartite talks only provides a modus oprandi not the solution itself. Those who have no stakes in the dispute can suggest such a way out. But for people for whom the resolution of Kashmir problem is a matter of life and death, this does not mean anything unless it reflects the wishes of Kashmiri masses. In order to formulate this stand there is a need of a public debate. Those who have monopolized the movement cannot be expected to decide upon the issue that concerns Kashmir society as a whole. Public debate is also likely to generate new ideas that can serve as food for thought and material for home work for our leaders. Our leaders are presumed to do such a home work before participating in any sort of negotiations. Internationally, India at present is under tremendous pressure for resolution of Kashmir dispute. Any wrong step on the part of leaders can provide it a pretext to blunt this pressure and score points in its propaganda warfare. There are also very strong reasons to believe that offer for negotiations is not motivated by a sincere desire for seeking a solution but an attempt to keep the leadership engaged in a futile exercise of talks. This can provide a cover and a time to break the will of insurgency through extensive use of military might.
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