One cannot befool all people at the time. Architects of Indian foreign policy however feel that they can do so although they are the ones who ultimately end up with blunders. Story starts from Kashmir dispute that was referred to the United Nations by India. Once the repercussions of this mistake were realized the problem was projected as a bilateral issue with the claim that the U.N have no locus standi in it. For obvious reasons, the Indian point of view was rejected and UN standing in the dispute continues to be asserted through maintenance of an observer’s mission in Kashmir.
During the cold war era India remained part of Soviet backyard (U.S. terminology) and benefited from this position in every respect. India availed Soviet VETO for blocking UN Security Council resolutions against its Kashmir policy. At the same time pursuits for marketing Indian democratic setup continued in the West. After disintegration of the Soviet Union India offered its services for containing “Islamic fundamentalism” which was projected as an emerging challenge to American hegemony. Inspite of rejoicing for the diminishing strategic importance of Pakistan and overmagnifying its own importance as a big market for American goods India could not sell the idea of its newly self-assumed importance for the West. Americans were not ready to forget the cold war honey-moon of Indians with the communist block. Whatever positive opinions existed for India, were blown up by the BJP government through Pokhran nuclear explosions. Bus diplomacy of Vajpayee seems to be a replay of previous somersaults of Indian diplomacy.
Soon after its nuclear tests, India through its aggressive postures created an impression that it was trying to blackmail Pakistan by issuing threats of war. L.K Advani was in forefront of these bullying tactics. Atal Behari Vajpayee tacitly endorsed this line by associating Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah with his visit to the explosion site in Pokran. When the Indian monopoly over nuclear deterrence was blown up through Pakistani tests, offensive postures, manifested through L.K Advani evaporated. Indian government had to reconcile with the existence of Pakistan as a nuclear state. Realising futility of aggressive approach, Vajpayee started contemplating for an alternative strategy. “Peace offensive” was the only option available against a strong enemy according to dictates of arthshastra. India however wanted to wait before launching this strategy so that memories of its aggressive postures get erased. But there were other factors which necessitated an urgent conciliatory gesture.
For a long time Islamabad has been yearning for low intensity warfare in Kashmir. While doing so, Pakistan wanted to evade risk of Indian retaliation on its international borders. In Kashmir, Pakistan has an edge because of public alienation towards India. Elsewhere they could not afford a direct confrontation on account of Indian numerical superiority in men and Conventional weapons. For past ten years of Kashmir militancy, India could not retaliate because of latent Pakistani nuclear deterrent. Now when threat of a nuclear confrontation is manifest, India can’t take risk of direct confrontation. Such an adventure can lead to an atomic war. Indian government is left with only alternative of exhausting its army in combating insurgencies within the areas of its control.
Another fact that has aggravated the situation for India is the control of Taliban over Afghanistan. With the consolidation of Taliban power more and more pan-Islamic fighters are getting free to participate in Kashmir militancy. They are already posing a serious problem to Indian army by sustaining militancy in remote areas. This along with hardening attitude of extremists in Akalidal can’t be over looked while analysing the factors that led Vajpayee to under take the bus journey to Pakistan.
On the international front both India and Pakistan were subjected to economic sanctions soon after their atomic explosions. With every passing day their economies started to reflect impact of these sanctions. Russian Prime Minister’s suggestion of Indian, Russian and Chinese strategic alliance came to the rescue of Pakistan. Overnight Pakistan regained its strategic importance for the West same way as it did after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in eighties. This led to relaxing of sanctions against Pakistan. India alone was singled out for feeling the bite of these punitive measures. This scenario forced Vajpayee to launch a peace offensive against Pakistan at this juncture. India anticipated a positive international opinion in its favour as a result of this offensive. Vajpayee initiative was similar to one that was undertaken by Zia-ul-Haque during the operation brass tracks. Getting sandwiched between the Russian army in Afghanistan and Indian aggressive postures, Zia-ul-Haque launched this offensive to have respite from Indian pressure and concentrate on Afghanistan exclusively. He came to India to watch a cricket match. This fizzled out the Indian propaganda of tension on Indo-Pak borders. Atal Behari Vajpayee also wanted to diffuse the international pressure and Pakistani projection of Kashmir as a nuclear flash point. He intended to give concessions on other issues and secure disposal of Kashmir dispute to cold storage. Vajpayee was also under an illusion that he by his oratory can whip up emotions of friendship and create a pressure against Pakistani rulers from within for a reconciliation with India.
If one goes by discussion of Indian commentators Saichen, Wular barrage, Tulbul dam and business were the issues on which some progress was anticipated. Kashmir was likely to be put on back burner. Outcome of the bus diplomacy however, reflects that except Kashmir and business none of the issues listed above were deliberated. Regarding Kashmir, there was a formal statement that the issue needs to be addressed on priority basis. Proposal of a taskforce was accepted to ‘expedite’ trade between the two countries.
Since Vajpayee visited Lahore as a Prime Minister, government over there had no option but to receive him. He however was given the indication of popular mood through demonstrations of opposition parties. Even Benazir avoided participation in the official functions organised in his honour. Instead of generating emotions for peace, bus diplomacy provoked demonstrations on Kashmir. Only option left with Nawaz Sharif was to remain stiff in his dealings with the visiting Indian premier thus making chances of any positive out come impossible. One can’t rule out the hand of Pakistani establishment in the negative postures of Pak opposition.
Internationally as well as in Pakistan, the trip did not attract much media coverage. Some members of the international community besides issuing formal statements of appreciation did not show any inclination of relaxing sanctions against India.
Contrary to confusing poetic jargons of Vajpayee, the bus journey should have symbolised a down to earth approach as compared to hazy aerial adventures undertaken previously. Such an approach needs hard decisions including the ones relating to redrawing of border. It was after all the writer of jung na honay dengay mantra who welcomed the redefinition of borders by describing Indra Gandhi as Avtar of Durga for her role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. If borders could be redefined in Soviet Union, East Europe, Hongkong, and Indonesia for peace, why can’t there be recourse to similar change in the sub-continent. Being prime minister of a fragile government, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was not in a position to take such decisions. The peace offensive thus stands blunted.
During the cold war era India remained part of Soviet backyard (U.S. terminology) and benefited from this position in every respect. India availed Soviet VETO for blocking UN Security Council resolutions against its Kashmir policy. At the same time pursuits for marketing Indian democratic setup continued in the West. After disintegration of the Soviet Union India offered its services for containing “Islamic fundamentalism” which was projected as an emerging challenge to American hegemony. Inspite of rejoicing for the diminishing strategic importance of Pakistan and overmagnifying its own importance as a big market for American goods India could not sell the idea of its newly self-assumed importance for the West. Americans were not ready to forget the cold war honey-moon of Indians with the communist block. Whatever positive opinions existed for India, were blown up by the BJP government through Pokhran nuclear explosions. Bus diplomacy of Vajpayee seems to be a replay of previous somersaults of Indian diplomacy.
Soon after its nuclear tests, India through its aggressive postures created an impression that it was trying to blackmail Pakistan by issuing threats of war. L.K Advani was in forefront of these bullying tactics. Atal Behari Vajpayee tacitly endorsed this line by associating Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah with his visit to the explosion site in Pokran. When the Indian monopoly over nuclear deterrence was blown up through Pakistani tests, offensive postures, manifested through L.K Advani evaporated. Indian government had to reconcile with the existence of Pakistan as a nuclear state. Realising futility of aggressive approach, Vajpayee started contemplating for an alternative strategy. “Peace offensive” was the only option available against a strong enemy according to dictates of arthshastra. India however wanted to wait before launching this strategy so that memories of its aggressive postures get erased. But there were other factors which necessitated an urgent conciliatory gesture.
For a long time Islamabad has been yearning for low intensity warfare in Kashmir. While doing so, Pakistan wanted to evade risk of Indian retaliation on its international borders. In Kashmir, Pakistan has an edge because of public alienation towards India. Elsewhere they could not afford a direct confrontation on account of Indian numerical superiority in men and Conventional weapons. For past ten years of Kashmir militancy, India could not retaliate because of latent Pakistani nuclear deterrent. Now when threat of a nuclear confrontation is manifest, India can’t take risk of direct confrontation. Such an adventure can lead to an atomic war. Indian government is left with only alternative of exhausting its army in combating insurgencies within the areas of its control.
Another fact that has aggravated the situation for India is the control of Taliban over Afghanistan. With the consolidation of Taliban power more and more pan-Islamic fighters are getting free to participate in Kashmir militancy. They are already posing a serious problem to Indian army by sustaining militancy in remote areas. This along with hardening attitude of extremists in Akalidal can’t be over looked while analysing the factors that led Vajpayee to under take the bus journey to Pakistan.
On the international front both India and Pakistan were subjected to economic sanctions soon after their atomic explosions. With every passing day their economies started to reflect impact of these sanctions. Russian Prime Minister’s suggestion of Indian, Russian and Chinese strategic alliance came to the rescue of Pakistan. Overnight Pakistan regained its strategic importance for the West same way as it did after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in eighties. This led to relaxing of sanctions against Pakistan. India alone was singled out for feeling the bite of these punitive measures. This scenario forced Vajpayee to launch a peace offensive against Pakistan at this juncture. India anticipated a positive international opinion in its favour as a result of this offensive. Vajpayee initiative was similar to one that was undertaken by Zia-ul-Haque during the operation brass tracks. Getting sandwiched between the Russian army in Afghanistan and Indian aggressive postures, Zia-ul-Haque launched this offensive to have respite from Indian pressure and concentrate on Afghanistan exclusively. He came to India to watch a cricket match. This fizzled out the Indian propaganda of tension on Indo-Pak borders. Atal Behari Vajpayee also wanted to diffuse the international pressure and Pakistani projection of Kashmir as a nuclear flash point. He intended to give concessions on other issues and secure disposal of Kashmir dispute to cold storage. Vajpayee was also under an illusion that he by his oratory can whip up emotions of friendship and create a pressure against Pakistani rulers from within for a reconciliation with India.
If one goes by discussion of Indian commentators Saichen, Wular barrage, Tulbul dam and business were the issues on which some progress was anticipated. Kashmir was likely to be put on back burner. Outcome of the bus diplomacy however, reflects that except Kashmir and business none of the issues listed above were deliberated. Regarding Kashmir, there was a formal statement that the issue needs to be addressed on priority basis. Proposal of a taskforce was accepted to ‘expedite’ trade between the two countries.
Since Vajpayee visited Lahore as a Prime Minister, government over there had no option but to receive him. He however was given the indication of popular mood through demonstrations of opposition parties. Even Benazir avoided participation in the official functions organised in his honour. Instead of generating emotions for peace, bus diplomacy provoked demonstrations on Kashmir. Only option left with Nawaz Sharif was to remain stiff in his dealings with the visiting Indian premier thus making chances of any positive out come impossible. One can’t rule out the hand of Pakistani establishment in the negative postures of Pak opposition.
Internationally as well as in Pakistan, the trip did not attract much media coverage. Some members of the international community besides issuing formal statements of appreciation did not show any inclination of relaxing sanctions against India.
Contrary to confusing poetic jargons of Vajpayee, the bus journey should have symbolised a down to earth approach as compared to hazy aerial adventures undertaken previously. Such an approach needs hard decisions including the ones relating to redrawing of border. It was after all the writer of jung na honay dengay mantra who welcomed the redefinition of borders by describing Indra Gandhi as Avtar of Durga for her role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. If borders could be redefined in Soviet Union, East Europe, Hongkong, and Indonesia for peace, why can’t there be recourse to similar change in the sub-continent. Being prime minister of a fragile government, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was not in a position to take such decisions. The peace offensive thus stands blunted.
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